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Abstract
Public finance is strongly aﬀected by tax evasion, which implies
that public sector resources are very limited. Most of the analysis on
how to fight tax evasion focused on the ways to deter evasion through
incentives to people not to evade.
This model has a diﬀerent approach: instead of directly reward-
ing/punishing agents, it gives incentives to an agent to ensure that
some other agents are obliged to declare their revenue. In particular,
the idea is to give incentives to consumers (through itemised deduc-
tions) to declare their expenditure. This forces sellers to declare their
earnings or, at least, it makes it more costly for them to convince
buyers to buy on the black market.
I show that under few conditions, for a given level of taxation, it
is optimal to allow for partial itemised deductions.
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"When there is an income tax, the just man will pay more and the unjust
less on the same amount of income” (Plato (nd))
1 Introduction
Public finance is strongly aﬀected by tax evasion, which implies that public
sector resources are very limited. It seems very hard to quantify the impact
of evasion on tax proceeds from an empirical point of view. According to
Franzoni (1999), the US federal tax gap1 has been estimated at about 17%.
Some older and more conservative estimations by Cowell (1985) indicate that
in the 80’s the black economy represented, in most western countries, 5% to
15% of GDP. According to McKay (1998) in 1994 the black economy counted
for between 27% (Italy) and 6% (Switzerland) of GDP. This last study is in
line with Schneide’s (2005) recent statistics.
Probably the most well known works on tax compliance are Allingham
and Sandmo (1972) and (1991). In the last two decades, many articles have
been published on tax avoidance and tax evasion2 and many surveys are now
available (among the most complete, Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1998) focuses
on tax avoidance and it is more theory oriented while Andreoni, Erard, and
Feinstein (1998) is more concerned with empirical works).
Even if, from the public budget constraint, it seems clear that something
should be done to fight tax evasion, from a social welfare point of view, it
is not so clear-cut. On the one hand, it is generally expensive to minimize
evasion. On the other hand, taxes are distortive and evasion might partially
overcome this distortion:3 an interesting analysis of welfare consequences of
1Tax gap, according to the United States Department of Treasury, measures the extent
to which taxpayers do not file their tax returns and pay the correct tax on time.
2The diﬀerence between tax evasion and tax avoidance is mainly that the first one
consists of not declaring some earnings that, by law, an agent is supposed to declare,
while tax avoidance consists of abusing some laws or, often, using the lack of detail in
some laws, to reduce the tax burden.
3Especially in the presence of information asymmetries, the government might not be
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tax evasion is developed by Davidson, Martin, and Wilson (2007). More-
over, if evasion were negatively correlated with income, tax evasion might
have some redistributive eﬀects.4 From a theoretical perspective, it is very
diﬃcult to state that fighting evasion is per se useful for social purposes.
An interesting discussion introducing many arguments for and against tax
evasion, taking into account the impact of the social welfare function and of
the model structure, is provided in section 7 of Cowell (1985).
Stating that, from a social point of view, it is always desirable to reduce
evasion could be considered too strong an assumption. Some reasons a wel-
fare planner or a politician might have for doing it could be, for instance, to
increase tax proceeds whenever needed, or to promote the country’s image
on an international ground. Other reasons might be that evasion is illegal
and thus, as for any other illicit activity, the government makes an eﬀort to
fight it. As underlined, for instance, in Fortin, Lacroix, and Montmarquette
(2000), black money is more likely to finance other illegal activities. Thus, by
reducing evasion, the government would reduce funds spent on illicit activi-
ties. One more rationale might be that agents in the economy have concerns
for equality and can have a sort of disutility in knowing other people evade,
thus evading taxes might be interpreted as a negative externality.
Most of the economic literature on tax evasion, with some notable ex-
ceptions such as Cremer and Gahvari (1993) and Marelli (1984), is mainly
devoted to the study of direct taxation. The main assumption is that con-
sumers, being rational, decide whether to evade or not on a simple "cost-
benefit" analysis. In reality the issue is, of course, more complex. Models
on tax evasion, oﬀering an over-simplified version of it, may fail to give clear
policy predictions to avoid or reduce evasion. What comes out from the most
recent literature on it is that the legislator has quite a wide set of instruments
able to optimise tax revenues. In the presence of diﬀerent revenue elasticities, it might be
that the second-best choice of government distorts sectors diﬀerently and evasion might
counterbalance the distortionary eﬀect of taxes.
4Of course, with the same social welfare function, if evasion were positively correlated
with income, results would be the opposite!
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to fight tax evasion (e.g. auditing, fines, incentives not to evade, direct taxes
to make it harder to evade). The interaction between those instruments is
not always perfectly clear. Sometimes evasion is due to the necessity to hide
some illegal activities, thus instruments to fight evasion might reduce but
not necessarily eliminate it completely: e.g. McKay (1998) assesses that
even with a 0% tax rate, the underground economy would still represent
about 4% of GDP, because of illegal activities and due to some economic
agents willing to avoid regulation laws.
As underlined by Franzoni (1999), most of the economic analysis of tax
evasion has concentrated on how evasion can be deterred through detection
and sanctions. More generally, the idea is to give incentives to people not to
evade (such as decreasing tax rates) or making it harder for agents to behave
illegally (e.g. by increasing consumption taxes, through higher fines or by
using more sophisticated audit systems).
The model I propose diﬀers from the afore mentioned models because, in-
stead of directly rewarding/punishing agents, it gives incentives to an agent
to ensure others are obliged to declare their revenue. To be more specific,
the idea behind this model is to incentivize consumers to declare their ex-
penditure, indirectly forcing sellers to declare their earnings. Consumers can
reduce their tax base by a portion of the value of their real expenditure on
the legal market.
Giving consumers incentives to declare their purchase forces sellers to
declare their earnings or, at least, it makes it more costly for them to convince
buyers to buy on the black market. A practical example of a situation in
which a similar idea has been used is the French "Aide au Logement": the
government partially subsidises finance the rent of the poorest citizens. Flat-
owners are forced to declare their renting income or to reduce the rent by
the value of the subsidy.
I constructed a model where the deduction rate is, a priori, undetermined
and I compute, for a given level of taxation, the optimal deductibility rate
and show that, under some conditions, this rate is always positive; which
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means that, ceteris paribus, introducing deductions implies a) a relaxation
of the public budget constraint, which can be translated into higher tax
proceeds or lower tax rates (or both), and b) a reduction in the size of the
underground market.
Through a simple and clear model, I show that in equilibrium it is con-
venient to have some deductions and that this, meanwhile, reduces the level
of tax evasion and increases tax proceeds (or reduces the per capita average
tax burden). It shows that partial deductibility of expenditures is a suﬃ-
cient enough incentive for a proportion of citizens to declare their purchases
without negatively aﬀecting tax proceeds. The reduction in the amount of
collected taxes from citizens is less substantial than the increase in tax pro-
ceeds deriving from the reduction in profits-tax evasion. The model could
be generalised and applied to a labour supply-demand model or to a more
complex general equilibrium model.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: in section 2 I explain
my assumptions on market structure and the general scenario of the model;
subsection 2.1 analytically introduces the model, which is solved in subsection
2.2. Subsection 2.3 analyses tax proceeds and studies the impact of the main
variables. The last section concludes.
2 The market structure
Consider an economy with a single consumption good or service sold by
N identical firms5, which, a priori, are active on both the legal and black
markets.
Each active consumer has a unitary demand for the good, thus (if his
reservation price is higher than the market price) a consumer has to decide
whether to buy on the legal or underground market, but he does not choose
the quantity. The number of active consumers is normalised to N .
5I use the generic term "firm" to denote the supply-side player, who might be a pro-
ducer, a service provider, a retailer... .
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Firms are perfectly identical, at equilibrium they always behave in the
same way. Consumers are thus indiﬀerent when choosing among them. I
assume that, because of this, consumers are spread over all firms, so that we
observe a mass, 1, of consumers willing to buy from each firm.6 Considering
only N active agents, total demand for the good is very inelastic.7 Note that
even though total demand (that is, the quantity demanded on both the legal
and illegal market) is inelastic and equal to 1, given the interaction between
legal and illegal market, the demand on each of the two markets is elastic.
Given the previous assumptions, total demand for each firm is always equal
to 1, and what really matters is the proportion of legal and illegal goods that
are sold.
All consumers have an identical wealth, R, and are asked to pay taxes, t,
on it. Firms are subjected to a profit tax based on the size of their legal sales.
Being active on the black market reduces firms’ tax burden. On the other
hand, behaving against the law might result, with some positive probability,
in a fine. The expected value of the fine is assumed to be suﬃciently small
to ensure some evasion.8 Of course, if the legislator were able to credibly set
a suﬃciently high fine to discourage any kind of evasion, this model would
not need to exist.
I consider the case of a "profession", such as accountancy, medicine, law or
6We can interpret this assumption in many ways. One possibility is that there are
some congestion costs and no transportation costs: since at equilibrium all firms propose
the same conditions, consumers split among firms to reduce the congestion cost they
support. Another example where it would be reasonable to assume this is when agents are
uniformly distributed across a round city. There are some transportation costs and firms
are equidistant from one another. Since firms are all identical, each consumer buys from
the closest firm.
7This assumption is introduced to get rid of substitution eﬀects between good con-
sumption and savings.
8This assumption might be justified in several ways: on the one hand it might be very
hard to audit consumers and/or firms for some particular markets, thus the probability
of being punished is very small. Another possibility, in the spirit of Cremer and Gahvari
(1993) and Kolm (1973), is that the fine is for some reason bounded above, for instance
for limited liability, social cohesion, ethics or political reasons.
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engineering. In many countries, these professions are regulated. All members
wishing to practice have to pass a national exam to prove their aptitude,
subscribe to the "professional association", respect a behavioural code and
so forth. Among other obligations, members of the association are often
subject to some pricing rules: in some countries, the price of some services
might be fixed by the association, bounded above or below or fixed in a given
range.
Therefore, I assume that firms are price takers on the legal market, while
they can decide the price at which they sell on the underground one. The
model is much more general than that and can be applied to a wide range of
situations. What is crucial is that firms are not price setters.9
I assume that the professional association has imperfect information of
what occurs on the market. To fix the price, the association can only observe
what occurs on the legal market, as a matter of fact, it can only take into
consideration the demand for the legal good and not the illegal one.10 The
legal price pa is such that firms make some profits.11 Firms are taking the
9Consider the case of a competitive legal market, but also any situation in which a
third player is acting in the game, e.g. an authority or institution fixing the price of the
legal good. For instance, it might be that the legal market is regulated by an authority, or
it is a collusive oligopoly with the cartel agreeing on a common price. Other possibilities
might be that firms are just retailers with a (possibly unoﬃcial) sort of RPM agreement
with the producer, or they might have a franchise contract limiting firms’ behaviour and
leading to a common legal-market price.
The way price is determined and by whom is not qualitatively aﬀecting results, nor is it
important to know if, from a legal point of view, the entity fixing prices is allowed to do
so (as in the case of a regulator) or not (as it would be for the collusive oligopolistic firms
or RPM contracts).
10This assumption is particularly realistic when the association fixing the price is an
independent authority, such as a public regulator. Another possibility is that members of
the association have some interest in concealing from the association the fact that they
sell on the black market. This might occur for example under a collusive oligopoly, where
firms cannot declare to the cartel members that they are breaking the cartel selling on the
black market at a diﬀerent price from the one proposed by the cartel.
11This assumption is important because the firm must owe some taxes on its profit.
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legal price as given and maximise their profit with respect to the black market
price they are proposing. Firms are risk neutral.
Consumers have the same wealth R and utility function and I assume all
of them are risk neutral. Consumers have the choice of buying the good on
the legal or illegal market. As in a model of vertical diﬀerentiation, all agents
prefer to buy on the legal market. When the price on the underground mar-
ket is lower however, some consumers prefer to buy it there. The willingness
to pay for the legal good k is the same for every individual. The diﬀerence in
behaviour among diﬀerent consumers is due to a factor θ that I describe as
"aversion to illegality": basically agents consider for some (personal) reasons
that behaving against the law is bad per se and, feeling guilty when they
buy on the illegal market, their utility of consumption is reduced (this feel-
ing might be due, for example, to ethical or political reasons or reputation
concerns).12
2.1 The model
The professional association chooses the price in the interest of its members
and, in particular, in order to maximise aggregate profits.13 As previously
stated, it takes into account only the demand for legal goods. This results
It may occur because of the cost structure (e.g. under competition we might require an
increasing marginal cost function) or because of the market power the professional entity
might exert when fixing prices.
12From a mathematical point of view, this assumption might have been replaced by
a "risk-aversion" assumption, simply by some adjustments in the model. Nevertheless I
consider that it might be plausible that agents have diﬀerent ethical beliefs and we might
observe illegality-averse people as well as illegality-loving people. Think for example of
an agent that, for political reasons, is particularly concerned by the role of central power
and of the government. He certainly feels more uncomfortable when buying on the illegal
market compared to someone politically against the presence of a government such as, for
example, an anarchist.
13As long as some profits are ensured, the way the price is fixed is not crucial. I might
have simply considered an exogenous price or any pricing criterion leading to a price higher
than average cost.
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in the price of the legal good being equal to monopoly price, thus ensuring
positive profits for each firm even when they do not sell on the black market.14
Marginal costs are assumed to be constant (and denoted by c).
The professional association’s problem is simply
max
pa
(1− T )N(pa − c)qa(pa) (1)
where qa(pa) is the aggregated demand of legal good and T is the tax
professionals pay on profits.15 The generic solution to the problem is given
by the F.O.C.
pa = c− qa
µ
∂qa
∂pa
¶−1
(2)
The firm takes pa as given and can propose to their customers to operate
legally (subscript a stands for "above-ground"). If the transaction is declared,
the seller will have to declare his earning and thus will also have to pay
some taxes T on his profits. The two parties can also decide to operate
underground (in this case the subscript will be u). Transactions occur at
price pu and the seller will not pay taxes on these transactions.
As already mentioned in the previous section, I assume that a mass of
consumers, normalised to N , are willing to pay k, which is higher than the
legal price. Each firm serves the mass of consumers with unitary demand.16
14This is not always the case in the literature on tax evasion. Several articles assume
that firm’s long term expected profit is null since they make no profit on the above-ground
market and moreover expected profits on the black market equal expected fines.
15The association, as explained in the previous section, is not taking into account the
black market demand. For more details on that, see the previous section and, in particular,
footnote (10).
16The assumption of perfectly inelastic demand is not crucial for the model results,
but it is important to be able to disentangle policy eﬀects and substitution eﬀects. This
assumption, from an economic point of view, might be justified in several ways. If we
consider services oﬀered by professionals, such as medical care or legal assistance, people
often do not have the choice and have to purchase the service at almost any price. An-
other interpretation might be that we consider only that part of the population having a
willingness to pay higher than the legal price of the good (also the maximum price one
might pay in equilibrium) when normalising population to N .
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I denote by xa and xu the quantities demanded by a single individual, with
xa ∈ {0; 1}, xu ∈ {0; 1} and xa + xu = 1. Given the normalisation of the
number of consumers in the economy, the aggregated demands for each firm
are qa ∈ [0; 1] and qu ∈ [0; 1]. Since firms are identical and the model is
perfectly symmetric, qa and qu are the same for each firm and the total
demand of the market is simply given by Nqa and Nqu.
Knowing that the total demand firms face is constant and equal to 1,
if one tries to increase his sales on the black market, he is compromising
his own legal market. One justification of why it is reasonable to think
that his total demand is constant (i.e., each professional is a monopolist on
his underground market, any consumer can move from one firm to another)
regardless of the selling price is that demand is inelastic and, at equilibrium,
all professionals behave in the same way. Moreover, we can assume that
negotiations to induce the consumer to operate on the black market take
place after the service has already been provided. Of course this implies that
the consumer already accepted to buy the service at the legal price from that
firm, thus the main point is to know if he will accept to buy the good illegally
in exchange for a discount.
I assume that the black price is unilaterally chosen by the firm, by max-
imising his profits with respect to pu, taking into account consumers’ demand
and pa, and proposing the consumer with a "take it or leave it oﬀer".
His profits can be written as
π = (1− T )(pa − c)qa + (pu − c−
F
2
)qu (3)
where the first term represents his profit on the legal market and the second
one his expected profit on the illegal one. F is the expected value of the fine
when an agent is caught operating on the illegal market. It is supposed to
be shared between the professional and the consumer so that each of them
pays F
2
in expected terms.17
17As previously underlined, all agents are risk neutral.
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The professional’s program is then
max
pu
π (4a)
s.t. qa = 1− qu (4b)
The solution to (4) is given by the F.O.C.
qu = −
∂qu
∂pu
µ
pu − (1− T )pa − Tc−
F
2
¶
(5)
Given pa and pu, consumers maximise their utility function with respect
to the market on which they buy, i.e. they choose the value of the binary
variables xa and xu.
max
xa;xu
U(xa;xu;R) (6a)
Where
U(xa;xu;R) = [k + (R− pa)− t(R− dpa)]xa+
∙
θk + (R− pu)− tR−
F
2
¸
xu
(7)
Remember that k, the value agents accord to the good, is exogenous and
the same for all consumers. R is agents’ exogenous wealth, on which they
have to pay taxes t. d is the percentage of sales one is allowed to deduct from
one’s before-tax revenue in order to compute tax base.
θ is the consumers’ type, it is interpreted as "illegality aversion" (see
section 2 for more details). The lower the value of θ, the more the agent
is averse to illegality and thus the less he values the illegally bought good.
(1− θ) corresponds to the perceived loss of value of the service (percentage)
when an agent accepts to buy on the black market: obviously the higher this
value, the less likely he is to agree to an illegal transaction. θ is a random
variable with distribution θ ∼ U [0, 1].
Equation (7) represents agents’ utility when purchasing. The first term
in it is the utility of consumption of the legal good, while the second term is
the utility derived from the good when bought on the black market.
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Consumers’ outside opportunity, that is, their utility when they do not
purchase at all, would be (1− t)R. By the assumption that agents’ willing-
ness to pay is strictly higher than the good price (i.e. (1− dtpa) ≤ k), at
equilibrium everybody is buying 1 unit of good.
Consumers choose between buying legally or on the underground market.
Their choice depends on their type; more precisely, they prefer to declare
their purchases as long as
[1− dt] pa ≤ pu +
F
2
+ (1− θ)k
from which we obtain
θ ≤ 1 +
pu − [1− dt] pa + F2
k
d
= θ¯ (8)
2.2 Market equilibrium
I first give the conditions under which a firm has interest in selling on the
black market and consumers have buying on it. Then I derive the market
equilibrium and finally I evaluate the impact of deductions on the main
variables.
To ensure that sellers find it more convenient to sell on the black market
and thus that they try to convince consumers not to declare their purchase,
the price on the black market has to verify the condition
pu ≥
F
2
+ (1− T )pa + Tc (9)
If this condition is not satisfied, no tax evasion is observed.
Concerning consumers, we have one condition to ensure that all con-
sumers are active on one of the two markets, which is basically that con-
sumers’ willingness to pay is higher than the price. From equation (7) it
is easy to derive the necessary condition to have a positive level of legal
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consumption of the good, which is18
[1− dt] pa ≤ k (10)
This condition is assumed to be always verified, otherwise nobody would be
willing to buy on the legal market. At the end of this section it will be shown
that the aggregated demand for the legal good is always greater than that
for the illegal good. As a consequence, if this condition were not satisfied,
both the legal and the illegal market would disappear.19
The aggregated demand on each market depends on the distribution of
θ. In particular, because θ ∼ U [0, 1], we have that
qa = F (θ¯) = θ¯ (11a)
qu = 1− F (θ¯) = 1− θ¯ (11b)
Inequality (10) guarantees that θ¯ > 0, while the condition to have θ¯ ≤ 1
(ensuring that qu ≥ 0) is given by
0 < pu ≤ (1− dt)pa −
F
2
(12)
As long as inequalities (10) and (12) are satisfied, the aggregated demand
for the service is
qa = 1 +
pu − [1− dt] pa + F2
k
(13a)
qu =
[1− dt] pa − pu − F2
k
(13b)
18Basically this condition ensures that all consumers’ willingness to pay is higher than
the legal good price and thus at equilibrium we always have xa+xu = 1. If this condition
were not satisfied we would have xa = 0 for everybody, thus qa = 0.
19To be precise, the condition to have a positive aggregated demand qu > 0, is pu <
θk − F2 . It is possible to prove that in equilibrium this condition is never satisfied when
pa > k[1−dt] . Condition 10 is then necessary to have a positive aggregated demand all
markets combined, i.e. to have qa + qu > 0
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We now have all the conditions needed to compute the equilibrium: we
know under which conditions a firm is willing to sell on the black market
and under which conditions consumers are willing to buy. In order for some
transactions on the black market to take place, we need these conditions to
be compatible with each other. In other words, there must be some room
for negotiation: firms selling on the black market are saving money while for
consumers there is a cost of buying underground, which is the impossibility
to deduct their purchase. If the cost for consumers is smaller than the surplus
firms can make, it is rational for both of them to find an agreement in order
to exchange the good on the black market. I assume that all market power
is given to the firm, which makes a "take-it or leave-it oﬀer".20
Combining equations (9) and (12) we can obtain the condition (equation
14) under which both the professional and some consumers are willing to
operate on the black market and thus we observe some tax evasion.
(T − dt)pa > F + TC (14)
To interpret this condition, it is maybe more convenient to rearrange equation
(14) as
T (pa − c) > F + dtpa (15)
The LHS of (15) is the firm’s cost declaring a sale and thus the cost of
behaving honestly.
The RHS is the total cost of evasion, represented by the total expected
cost of the fine, increased by consumers’ opportunity cost of evading. In the
presence of purchase deductibility, this is an increasing function of the tax
rate since, when evading, consumers cannot deduct their expenditures.
It is now possible to derive equilibrium prices and quantities.
20Of course, as long as there is some room for negotiation, the way prices are fixed does
not really aﬀect the model results. Other possibilities could have been to equally share
the surplus or to introduce a bargaining phase during which the two parts try to agree on
a given price.
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From equations (5) and (13b) we obtain that ∂qu∂pu = −
1
k and
pu =
2− dt− T
2
pa +
Tc
2
(16)
Note that the fine does not aﬀect the price level pu. This is due to
the fact that, in this model, the eﬀect of a change in the fine is perfectly
counterbalanced by a change on the quantity exchanged on the black market,
so that we do not observe any change in the equilibrium price. In fact, an
increase in the expected fine calls for an increase in price from the supply side
(because the firm wants to earn more in order to compensate for the expected
fine) and for a decrease in price from the demand side (since the higher
fine discourages some consumers, provoking a negative shock on the demand
curve). Both shocks have a negative impact on the exchanged quantity but
the two opposite eﬀects on the price oﬀset each other, both agents (the firm
and the consumer) being risk neutral and equally sharing the fine.
The coeﬃcient of pa in (16) is always positive21 and smaller or equal
to 1. The second term indicates that the underground price is positively
aﬀected by the corporate tax: the rationale for this is that selling on the black
market implies not declaring some production costs as well, thus T aﬀects
the professional opportunity cost of evasion. When declaring his sales, the
professional can reduce his gross profit by Tc, thus for every undeclared unit
sold, the professional tax burden increases by an amount Tc.
Given pu, through (13b) it is possible to compute the exchanged quantity
as a function of the price of the legally exchanged good, which is:
qu =
1
2k
[(T − dt)pa − (F + Tc)] (17)
Furthermore, combining equations (2), (4b), (16) and (17), we obtain the
21This means that prices are positively correlated, which implies that they are strategic
complements and, as we will see later on, quantities are strategic substitutes.
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equilibrium prices pa and pu, and the equilibrium quantities qa and qu:
pa =
F + 2k + (2T − dt)c
2(T − dt) (18)
pu =
(2− dt− T ) (F + 2k) + 2Tc(1− dt)
4(T − dt) +
(2− dt)c
4
(19)
qa =
1
2
+
F + cdt
4k
(20)
qu =
1
2
− F + cdt
4k
(21)
Clearly, this is the interior solution. To have an interior solution, in
addition to (10), we need the following conditions to be fulfilled:
T > dt (22a)
cdt+ F ≤ 2k (22b)
Condition (22a) means that, to have some evasion, the cost of being hon-
est for a firm has to be higher than the opportunity cost of not being honest
for a consumer. That is to say, the tax the firm saves when operating on the
black market has to be higher than the tax reduction the consumer would
obtain if he declared a purchase. This condition says that for transactions
to take place on the black market, there must be some room for negotiation
between professionals and consumers. If one of the previous conditions were
not satisfied, we would have a corner solution, with qa = 1; qu = 0 and
pa = k1−td .
Note that (22a) implies that ∂qu∂pa =
T−dt
2k > 0 and
∂qa
∂pa
= −T−dt
2k < 0, and
thus the good is normal and illegal sales are positively correlated with legal
price. Measures aimed at reducing the price of the legal good then indirectly
reduce tax evasion.
Given the expressions for qa and qu we can also compute the impact of a
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change in the wealth tax and in the deduction rate:
∂qa
∂d
=
ct
4k
> 0
∂qa
∂t
=
cd
4k
> 0
∂pa
∂d
=
[F + 2k + Tc] t
2(T − dt)2 > 0
The impact of an increase in the deduction rate is unambiguous: it pushes
legal good prices upward and it reduces evasion. Combining results from
∂qa
∂pa
< 0 and ∂qa∂d > 0 and
∂pa
∂d > 0 we can conclude that the direct impact of d
on qa is bigger than the one on pa, which explains the reason why the total
eﬀect on qa is positive even though we observe an increase in legal price.
2.3 Tax proceeds
In many countries, especially in eastern and southern Europe, deductions
are not a widely used policy instrument: e.g. in OECD (1990) estimations
indicate that in Italy and Spain, but also in the UK and Ireland, allowed de-
ductions represent at most 5% to 9% of taxable income and that in most of
OECD countries itemised deductions are always below 15%, with , exceptions
made for a few countries. Among OECD countries, in France and Scandi-
navian countries deductions are more frequent, with rates between 25% and
30%.
The aim of this model is to show that under some quite general conditions
(mainly: markets concerned by tax evasion and with limited expected fines),
allowing people to deduct purchases might result in a reduction in tax evasion
without negatively aﬀecting the public budget constraint.
Total public income is given by tax proceeds from the corporate tax on
profits, the tax on wealth (net of purchase deductions) and the expected
income raised through fines:
TP = N [T (pa − c)qa + Fqu + t(R− dpaqa)] (23)
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or, equivalently, TP = N [[(T − td)pa − Tc] qa + Fqu + tR].
Optimal behaviour for a social planner might mean either keeping tax
proceeds constant, reducing taxes as much as possible, or keeping taxes con-
stant and raising as much money as possible.
The aim of my work is to study the impact of deduction on tax evasion
and on tax proceeds. To do that, I used the simplest possible model, also to
show that tax evasion can be reduced through a very simple scheme. One
drawback of this model is that it cannot be used to compute the optimal
tax rate: the assumption on demand inelasticity and the fact that consumers
cannot hide their wealth together imply that rising t would increase tax
revenue without distorting consumers’ behaviour or increasing tax evasion.
Thus, if one wanted to maximise BC with respect to t, the solution would
be t = 1.
Maximising TP with respect to T is no more helpful because a variation
of the corporate tax implies a reduction in pa that perfectly oﬀsets the wished
increase in public revenue, since ∂pa∂T = −
pa−c
(T−dt) .
22
The most appealing feature of this model is that it is simple and it per-
fectly captures the eﬀects of deductions on taxes and evasion. The relevant
question this model can answer concerns finding, for a given level of taxation,
the level of deduction which maximises public tax proceeds.
In other words, it solves the government’s problem:
max
d
N [T (pa − c)qa + Fqu + t(R− dpaqa)]
s.t. pa =
[F + 2k + (2T − dt)c]
2(T − dt)
qa =
1
2
+
(F + cdt)
4k
the solution of which is d = 2k−Fct .
22To be more precise, a change in T aﬀects both the size and the slope of the demand
and supply functions for both qa and qu. The equilibrium quantity remains the same, but
the price falls. This implies that the government collects a larger share of profits (because
of the increase in T ) but legal profits are smaller, since pa dropped.
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Of course I considered the equilibrium result, taking into account only
the interior solution to the problem given that, if we were in presence of no
evasion, there would be no reasons to find instruments to reduce it!
The maximisation problem yields a clear-cut result: as long as the condi-
tions to ensure a certain level of evasion in the economy are satisfied and if
the expected fine for evasion is suﬃciently low (that is F < 2k), it is always
beneficial for society to have a positive level of deduction.
This model indicates that, of course, the best remedy against tax evasion
would be to increase fines and audit probability (assuming no or few costs
of auditing) but when this is not feasible (e.g. because of some diﬃculties
to audit, limited liability...), using a system of indirect incentives, such as
the one described, oﬀers the legislator a tool to decrease evasion without
negatively aﬀecting tax proceeds.
Starting from a situation where deductions are not available, under the
few assumptions of having evasion and F < 2k, deductions do not eliminate
evasion completely but they help in reducing it. This means that the legisla-
tor could, by introducing them, reduce taxes keeping tax proceeds unaﬀected,
or keep taxes constant and increase tax proceeds.
3 Concluding remarks
The aim of this work was to investigate what the consequences are of using
itemised deductions to reduce evasion and to show that, in a wide range of
situations, it is beneficial to allow a given level of deductions.
Through a simple model and without any restrictive assumption, I showed
that introducing deductions in a market characterised by tax evasion and
diﬃculties in punishing tax evaders, the cost of introducing deductions (that
is, the drop in tax proceeds) is more than compensated for by a fall in tax
evasion and by the subsequent increase in tax proceeds due to the larger
population paying taxes.
The example I used to introduce the model is quite specific, but the model
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applies to a wide range of situations and its results are robust.
An interesting extension of the model could be to study welfare consid-
erations. It is clear that the honest part of the population should be better
oﬀ, since tax proceeds are higher without any additional cost for them. The
impact on the other agents is less clear, since on the one hand they are now
paying more taxes but on the other hand they can profit from better public
services and derive more utility from the legal good consumption.
Another possible extension could be to consider the implications in terms
of optimal behaviour for a politician, that is: would it be strategically optimal,
for a politician aiming to be elected, to propose such a policy?
References
Allingham, M. G. and A. Sandmo (1972). Income tax evasion: A theoret-
ical analysis. Journal of Public Economics 1, 323—328.
Allingham, M. G. and A. Sandmo (1991). Income tax evasion: A theoret-
ical analysis. Modern Public Finance, Atkinson, A.B. (ed.) 1, 50—65.
Andreoni, J., B. Erard, and J. Feinstein (1998, June). Tax compliance.
Journal of Economic Literature 36 (2), 818—860.
Cowell, F. (1985). The economic analysis of tax evasion. Bullettin of Eco-
nomic Research 37.
Cremer, H. and F. Gahvari (1993). Tax evasion and optimal commodity
taxation. Journal of Public Economics 50, 261—275.
Davidson, C., L. Martin, and J. Wilson (2007). Eﬃcient black markets.
Journal of Public Economics (forthcoming).
Fortin, B., G. Lacroix, and C. Montmarquette (2000, October). Are under-
ground workers more likely to be underground consumers? Economic
Journal 110(466), 838—60.
Franzoni, L. A. (1999). Tax evasion and tax compliance. Encyclopedia of
Law and Economics vol. 4, pp. 51—94.
20
Kolm, S. C. (1973). A note on optimum tax evasion. Journal of Public
Economics 2, 265—270.
Marelli, M. (1984). On indirect tax evasion. Journal of Public Eco-
nomics 25, 181—196.
McKay, I. e. a. (1998). Report to the new zeland treasurer and minister of
revenue by a committee of experts on tax compliance.
OECD (1990). The personal income tax base. OECD.
Plato (n.d.). Book 1. In The Republic, Chapter Socrates and Thrasy-
machus. Transalted by B. Jowett.
Schneide, F. (2005). Shadow economies around the world: What do we
really know? Journal of Political Economy 23/1, 598—642.
Slemrod, J. and S. Yitzhaki (1998). Tax avoidance, evasion and adminis-
tration. Handbook in Public Economics, (Auerbach and Feldstein eds).
21
